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LOCAL SPOILERS AND PATHWAYS TO RECONCILIATION: 
THE POLISH PERSPECTIVE ON THE POLISH-UKRAINIAN 
RELATIONS IN THE BORDERLANDS1 
 
Maciej Stępka - Agata Mazurkiewicz - Marcin Zubek* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
In the last three decades Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation has taken a structured and regular 
form of an international dialogue dominated and controlled by central governments, which 
simultaneously diminished the importance of the local perspective. Yet, it is the regional 
level where the Polish-Ukrainian tensions have originally escalated at, and the local 
borderlands’ communities have always played a crucial role in the inter-ethnic relations. 
That is why this article tackled the topic of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation as framed by the 
Polish borderlands’ elites, framing it with three dimensions of reconciliation: encounters, 
relationship, and innovation. It critically addressed the intractable tensions between Poles 
and Ukrainians in the borderlands, exploring the contemporary dynamics of distrust, 
narrowness and historical resentments which are continuously present in the local Polish 
narrative and stand in the way of reconciliation. The role of the European integration was 
viewed as an important context and a double-edged sword in the Polish-Ukrainian 
reconciliation. The article contended that it is crucial to look at Polish-Ukrainian 
reconciliation beyond the state-level and consider that without the involvement 
of the borderlands and their perspective, the process is still on a rocky road. The findings 
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were based on primary and secondary sources, including semi-structured interviews 
conducted in the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands. 
 
Key words:  reconciliation, borderlands, Polish-Ukrainian relations, local elites, 
European integration 
 
Introduction 
The 20th Century weighed heavily on the Polish-Ukrainian relations. The 
violent events of the Volhynia massacre, Polish retaliatory killings and forced 
resettlements of the Ukrainians in Poland left the two communities distanced, 
divided and unreconciled. Only after the fall of communism both nations could 
address these issues and embark on a path to reconciliation. This process has 
been primarily controlled by state actors and based on international dialogue 
which with time assumed a more structured and regular form of cooperation 
(Burlyuk, 2017). Thus, the reconciliation has been fixed in terms of actors and 
practices, which in a long run proved to be neither successful nor satisfactory. 
Following the 2015 change of government in Poland, it has been further 
troubled with re-emerged tensions, such as the radicalisation of narratives 
regarding the Volhynia massacre, conflictual statements of both parliaments, 
and re-emergence of nationalism and historically motivated politics (Gierak-
Onoszko, 2016; Newsweek.pl, 2016). 
Instead of focusing on the state-driven process of reconciliation, susceptible 
to political perturbations, we employ a different perspective by providing a 
detailed and in-depth analysis of how the Polish local community problematized 
and dealt with the reconciliation process in the context of European integration 
in the period directly preceding the deterioration of state relations. We believe 
that this local point of view introduces a new quality and dynamic into the 
reconciliation process. Firstly, it addresses the problem at its roots, focusing on 
the communities for which the difficult and violent past is still alive. Secondly, it 
allows looking at the problem from the perspective of the people, who are 
personally engaged and invested in the current Polish-Ukrainian affairs. Lastly, 
it enables the so far state-dominated process to open up to new stakeholders 
and ideas, possibly less sensitive to political fluctuations introduced by changing 
governments. As we recognise the importance of studying both Polish and 
Ukrainian perspectives, in this article we propose to focus on the Polish 
borderlands’ elites. Thus, through the eyes of the Polish local elites, we show 
how the borderlands’ community looked at the vital aspects of the Polish-
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Ukrainian relations, how they positioned themselves within the reconciliation 
process, and how they perceived and interacted with their Ukrainian 
counterparts. In this way, we reveal a complex mixture of distrust, distance and 
historical resentment with a pursuit for meaningful cooperation and even 
partnership. In this intricate design, European integration visibly underscores 
local pathways to reconciliation introducing an optimistic yet distanced outlook 
on the future relations. 
We begin our analysis with discussing the main characteristics of the 
borderlands’ approach towards the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation. The local 
perspective is framed with three dimensions within which reconciliation takes 
place: encounters, relationship, and innovation. The first two areas allow for 
uncovering how the borderlands’ communities framed the reconciliation process 
in reference to the difficult past (encounters) and problematic present 
(relationship). In these sections we show which aspects of the reconciliation were 
defined as crucial and the most problematic to the process. The last dimension is 
focused on the European integration and its local interpretation as a possible 
innovative contribution to the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation. In this section we 
discuss how the local elites imagined the impact of integration as a process 
intertwined with the future reconciliation between the Poles and Ukrainians. 
 
1 Setting out the Stage. Historical Overview of the Polish-
Ukrainian Conflict 
The Polish-Ukrainian conflict originates from the unequal status of the two 
nations, which historically inhabited the same geographical area, with the 
Roman Catholic Poles constituting the dominant group in the province 
(Zhurzenko, 2013, p. 176; see also Wojakowski, 2015). With no realistic 
prospect of establishing an independent Ukrainian nation-state, the 
Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsiya Ukrayins'kykh 
Natsionalistiv, OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrajinśka Powstanśka 
Armija, UPA) openly turned against the Poles in the first half of the 1940s 
(Marples, 2006). The ensuing Polish-Ukrainian conflict took lives of up to 
100,000 Poles and Ukrainians, starting with the so-called Volhynia Massacre 
perpetrated by UPA against Poles and the consequent spiral of retaliation 
engaging Polish partisans against Ukrainians (Snyder, 1999, p. 87). With the 
end of the Second World War, the newly formed communist government in 
Poland relocated the Ukrainian nationals to the Soviet Ukraine resulting in the 
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expulsion of 492,000 people (Snyder, 1999, p. 108). The violent phase of the 
conflict ended in 1947 when in the framework of “Operation Vistula” (Akcja 
Wisła) the last remaining Ukrainians were deported from Galicia to the North-
Eastern Poland. 
The atrocities of the 1940s left deep scars in the Polish-Ukrainian relations 
and reinforced divisions that still weigh heavily on the region. On the one hand, in 
the eyes of the Ukrainians, they were the weaker side, denied independence and 
nationhood, subjected to colonisation, polonisation and forceful relocation 
(Pasieka, 2014). On the other hand, in the Polish discourse, the Ukrainians were 
the ones who were trying to “stab” the re-established Polish state in the “back”, 
collaborated with the Nazis and massacred innocent civilians in 1943. Those two 
narratives are very much exclusive and based on self-victimisation. Hence, for the 
most part, the state-driven reconciliation relied on finding the lowest common 
denominator and avoiding addressing the root causes of the conflict. The issue of 
reconciliation does not officially appear until the 1997 Joint Communiqué on 
Agreement and Reconciliation, in which Polish and Ukrainian Presidents 
condemn both: the wrongdoings of the Poles and the “Operation Vistula”, as well 
as the killings of the Poles in Volhynia (President of the Republic of Poland & 
President of Ukraine, 1997). As Kasianov notes, the official framework for 
debating the problem focused on avoidance of mutual recriminations and an 
orientation towards the future, which however did not put an end to discussions in 
society, especially among intellectuals (Kasianov, 2006, p. 251). 
In the next two decades, such state-centred reconciliation practices and 
discourse have been established and observed. The practice has been focused 
on high-level meetings filled with symbolic gestures, declarations and 
commemorative official visits, and the official reconciliatory discourse has been 
dominated by the (geo)political and economic dimensions (Burlyuk, 2017). The 
issues that concern the local communities appeared on the agenda only when 
they received considerable attention from the national public, as in the case of 
the devastation and renovation of the Polish Łyczakowski Cemetery in Lviv, 
repeatedly referred to by Polish and Ukrainian presidents (“Wizyta Prezydenta 
RP na Krymie,” 1998). In speeches given by the Polish Presidents, the 
reconciliation served as a tool to bring Polish and Ukrainian foreign policy 
agendas closer, as was the case in the aftermath of the 2004 Orange 
Revolution (“Polsko-Ukraiński gest pojednania,” 2006). This kind of 
“externalisation” was also visible in the attribution of blame in regards to the 
mutual violence. The Polish state level discourse was filled with the myth of 
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victimisation in this regard, putting part of the responsibility on the “Great 
Powers”, which incited the Poles and Ukrainians to murder each other 
(“Wystąpienie Prezydenta RP w Bykowni,” 2012). This sort of framing made it 
easier to avoid difficult bilateral issues. 
Together with the 2015 elections in Poland and the change of the 
government, the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliatory dialogue deteriorated. An 
extreme example of this change is the unprecedented resolution of the Polish 
Lower Chamber of Parliament on homage to victims of genocide by Ukrainian 
nationalists on the citizens of the Second Republic of Poland in the years 1943-
1945 (Sejm, 2016a). It was the first official document using the word “genocide” 
in relation to the Volhynia massacre, and has been widely criticised in Ukraine 
(TVN24.pl, 2016). Even though, just several months later, the Polish and 
Ukrainian Parliaments jointly adopted a reconciliatory Declaration of Memory 
and Solidarity calling for unbiased historical research and restraining 
controversies (Sejm, 2016b), a series of hostilities took place, including naming 
the Mayor of Przemyśl (a major Polish border-town) a persona non-grata in 
Ukraine2 (Choma, 2017; Babakova, 2018). Similarly, with the 2018 amendment 
to the Polish law on the Institute of National Remembrance, Poland equated the 
crimes of Ukrainian nationalists with the crimes of Nazism and Communism in 
Poland – a move met with disappointment and deep concern of the Ukrainian 
side (Interfax Ukraine, 2018).3 Thus, the Polish-Ukrainian state-led 
reconciliation proved to be rather superficial, filled with spectacular symbolic 
gestures and susceptible to political fluctuations. What it often neglected was 
the local perspective which may constitute an important piece of the 
reconciliation puzzle. 
 
2 Defining Research Methods and Research Sample 
The following analysis is based on empirical material retrieved through 
32 semi-structured interviews conducted in the historical province of Przemyśl 
(powiat przemyski), South-Eastern Poland. All interviews were conducted in 
Polish and then translated into English. The data was collected in two stages: 
                                                          
2  This status was withdrawn after an intervention of Ukraine’s President Petro Poroshenko (Choma, 
2017; Junko, 2017). 
3  Due to diplomatic and internal pressures the Law and Justice government decided to tone the bill 
down. In January 2019, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal questioned the wording of this bill, 
especially in reference to the term “Ukrainian nationalists” as too broad and not properly defined. 
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September 2013 and January 2014. Our respondents were selected using the 
chain referral sampling technique and included representatives of such groups 
as: local authorities and administration (12 respondents), Polish customs and 
border officials (6 respondents), activists (9 respondents), entrepreneurs 
(5 respondents), journalists from local newspapers and radio stations 
(2 respondents) and educators (4 respondents). Some of the respondents 
represented more than one group.  
These groups constitute the so-called “symbolic elites” who through “symbolic 
capital” exercise power over dominant discourses and narratives. According to 
van Dijk, they “may set the agendas of public discussion, influence topical 
relevance, manage the amount and type of information, especially who is being 
publicly portrayed and in what way” (van Dijk, 1989, p. 22). Within their particular 
domains, they control and shape public knowledge, affecting beliefs and attitudes 
towards the other (van Dijk, 1989, p. 22). Due to a limited access to 
representatives of the local clergy and their reluctance to express their opinions 
on the Polish-Ukrainian relations, in this study we concentrate on the perspectives 
of secular representatives of symbolic elites, in accordance with van Dijk’s 
original understanding of the term (van Dijk, 1989). We believe that the diversity 
within our research sample allows us to draw conclusions presented in this article, 
while at the same time we call for a supplementary in-depth research on the role 
of clergy in the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation (for an analysis of its role in the 
beginnings of this process see: Buzalka, 2006). The local elites are often 
identified as instigators and spoilers to reconciliation (Pasieka, 2016) but they also 
may be considered as possible mediators and facilitators of the process. That is 
why we frame them as powerful stakeholders who construct complex 
relationships and perspectives on the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation. In this article 
we predominantly focus on the local elites, which engage Ukraine and the 
Ukrainian minority in Poland in a wide scope of activities ranging from 
bureaucratic, educational, cultural and political, to purely economic and technical. 
Such a research sample allows uncovering the local perspective on the process 
by defining its most sensitive and challenging aspects. At the same time, the 
symbolic elites are the most competent to propose solutions to defined problems. 
The empirical material was supplemented with secondary sources from 
Polish local and national newspapers, as well as official documents and 
speeches. The analysis of this data allowed for a more comprehensive and 
detailed approach to the topic of local Polish perspective on reconciliation. 
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3 Theorising the Impact of European Integration on the 
Reconciliation Process 
In order to understand the borderlands' perspective on the Polish-Ukrainian 
reconciliation process, we develop a theoretical framework based on 
Lederach's assumptions on reconciliatory encounters, relationship, and 
innovation (Lederach, 1997). This approach allows for identification of 
dimensions sensitive to the local community and exploration of spoilers and 
enablers in the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation. As noted by Dwyer, 
“‘reconciliation’ has almost exclusively positive connotations, suggesting an end 
to antagonisms, the graceful acceptance of disappointment or defeat, the 
healing and repair of valuable friendships, and so on” (Dwyer, 1999, p. 82). In 
her view, reconciliation can only be achieved by incorporating perspectives of 
the antagonised “others”. However, this process cannot end with simple 
gestures or declarations, but must involve the restoration and rebuilding of 
relations between communities, far exceeding coexistence. It also means for the 
two groups to accept each other as interdependent partners and develop 
mutual trust (Staub, 2000, p. 376). The literature can be divided into two basic 
approaches to achieving reconciliation: based on “emotionalism” and on 
“realism”. Within the “emotional” perspective, reconciliation is “a difficult and 
delicate process that is not simply a matter of the head, but more so of the 
heart” (Fisher, 2001, p. 34). Reconciliation should thus be achieved through 
emotional healing based on an apology-forgiveness cycle and ability to express 
good feelings towards each other and towards their new relations (Bar-Tal, 
2009, p. 369). Within the “realistic” approach, reconciliation should be a rational 
process, detached from the sense of victimhood and the emotional aspects of 
the conflict (Eisikovits, 2004). Instead, it should be based on pragmatism and 
presented in a political and realistic context (Auerbach, 2009, p. 292). 
Lederach proposes to focus on three assumptions of reconciliation which 
allow defining spoilers and possible enablers to the process: “encounter”, 
“relationship” and “innovation” (Lederach, 1997, pp. 25–27). According to the 
first assumption, reconciliation entails an encounter not only of people but also 
of various activities. It is a social space where people should be able to express 
their historical grievances, anger, and perceived injustices. As such, encounters 
focus on dynamic practices, addressing the difficult past. The second of 
Lederach's assumptions concerns the relationship which reflects the current 
state of affairs between conflicted communities. It should entail not only a 
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peaceful separation and disengagement, but allow for building personal and 
inter-communal relations based on long-term cooperation and trust. Finally, 
innovation requires looking at reconciliation beyond the mainstream of interstate 
political relations, operational modalities, and discourses (Lederach, 1997, p. 
27). It is about opening up the reconciliation framework to new processes, ideas 
and actors while developing future pathways of cooperation. 
In order to frame this innovative component, we utilise Diez, Stetter and 
Albert's interpretation of the transformative power of integration and association 
in border conflicts (Thomas Diez, Stetter, & Albert, 2006). The theory outlines 
several scenarios, which hypothesize on different types of impact of integration on 
the conflicted borderlands. The authors argue that the EU membership may 
compel the actors through “sticks and carrots” to “change their political attitudes 
and policies vis-à-vis the other party towards conciliatory moves” (“compulsory 
impact” of the EU; Albert, Diez, & S. Stetter, 2008). In this case, the EU serves as 
a framework, which pressures the conflict into resolution and reconciliation. 
Further, the integration may be an important “enabling factor” (Albert et al., 2008, 
p. 27), allowing conflicted parties to link their political agendas with the EU. By 
working jointly towards resolution and reconciliation outside often radicalized 
domestic politics and actors, both communities would be able to reconnect in 
common projects and sustain the relationship with the assistance of the EU. The 
theory assumes that this cooperation leads to a broader societal effect, 
contributing to the development of social networks across the border (“connective 
impact”; Albert et al., 2008, p. 28). Diez, Stetter, and Albert argue that thus 
construed relationship has a potential to transform the conflictual components of 
identity, introducing more inclusive patterns of behaviour into the borderlands 
(“constructive impact”) (Albert et al., 2008, p. 28). 
Using Lederach’s perspective, we are able to explore the local approach to 
reconciliation between the Poles and Ukrainians. The assumptions of 
encounters and relationship serve as a basis to identify main spoilers of the 
process, while the concept of innovation, with help of Diez, Stetter and Albert’s 
theory, is used in order to reveal possible solutions to the defined problems as 
presented by the local community. 
 
4 Analysing the Pathways of Conflict and Reconciliation 
In the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands, the approach to reconciliation is shaped 
by direct proximity and interdependence with the “other”, as well as still vivid 
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memories of the violent past. Here, both rationalism and emotionalism are 
reflected in the local perspective on reconciliation. On the one hand, the long-
term involvement with the neighbour and the need for cooperation necessitates 
a more rational and pragmatic attitude towards the reconciliation. For this 
reason, the symbolic elites tend to factor in the political and realistic context of 
the borderlands and the economic condition of the region. On the other hand, 
the unresolved issues from the past and emotional orientations of distrust and 
pain call for the incorporation of emotional healing into the process. This mixture 
of approaches helps the symbolic elites to face the difficult past and to function 
in a borderlands’ social and economic space, limiting the impact of resentments 
and historical grievances. 
Yet, the region still witnesses conflict episodes which occasionally erupt on 
the edge of politics and history (see: Ślęzak, 2006). This is inconsistent with the 
official narrative produced by the state, which only focuses on the bigger 
picture, neglecting the local dilemmas and challenges of reconciliation. For this 
reason, the symbolic elites described the process mostly as superficial or 
incomplete, calling for the incorporation of the local level. As one of our 
respondents noted: 
Everyone is a little bit responsible. (...) No one has better opportunities of 
crossing the borders and boundaries and engaging in dialogue than local 
authorities. The biggest influence, but also the least spectacular, because 
time-consuming, belongs to the teachers. The church has yet a different 
responsibility. (Teacher, aged 48) 
By including the local level, the reconciliation process could achieve a higher 
saturation of different actors, activities, and perspectives. In this way, the 
process would be much more sensitive to the needs and challenges of the 
borderlands, thus increasing the chances for meaningful reconciliatory 
encounters and successful relationships. 
 
4.1 Encounters, Truth, and Acknowledgment 
Borderlands constitute a unique place of “encounters” between different 
actors and their activities, thus constructing a social and symbolic space for 
reconciliation (Kurczewski, 2015). These reconciliatory encounters create a 
possibility for contestation and discussion about antagonised worldviews and 
interpretations of common history. They can assume various forms of 
interactions, including casual conversations between individuals, educational 
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workshops, or dialogue between local authorities and NGOs. The purpose of 
reconciliatory encounters is to establish a form of communication, between and 
within groups, that allows addressing the difficult history and common issues 
“without getting locked into a vicious cycle of mutual exclusiveness inherent in 
the past” (Lederach, 1997, p. 26). In the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands, 
reconciliatory encounters are limited by a distinctive nature of interactions 
between the two groups. 
Wojakowski observes that the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands are 
predominantly narrow in terms of social space and socio-cultural interactions 
(Wojakowski, 2002, p. 123). The spectrum of interactions between the two 
ethnic groups is mostly limited to pragmatic and functional areas of activity such 
as border trade and technical cooperation between local and border authorities. 
This claim is mirrored in our empirical material, which indicates that the highest 
intensity of interactions can be observed in political-technical and economic 
realms. The space of reconciliatory encounters between the Poles and 
Ukrainians is therefore narrow, as their interactions are driven mostly by an 
expectation of financial profits and the need to solve ongoing problems. 
However, the local elites indicated that in order for reconciliation to be 
successful, more emphasis should be put on the encounters that address the 
problems of the past underlying the tensions in the region. As elaborated in one 
of the interviews: 
We should talk and we should talk about everything. (...) we tend to talk only 
when something bad happens, or when we have to give a property to the 
Ukrainians, or when the Poles complain about their life in Ukraine. 
(Journalist, aged 47) 
According to our respondents, the dialogue has to go much deeper than the 
technicalities of everyday life. Only then both communities will be able to 
address deeply rooted historical grievances and mutual accusations. 
The symbolic elites indicated that the reconciliatory encounters between 
Poles and Ukrainians should be centred around the historical truth and 
supplemented by acknowledgment of the inconvenient facts. The historical truth 
remains highly contested and is a part of a political game between and within 
the states. Some of the facts are still challenged, including such basic aspects 
as the nature of the tragic events, the number of victims, identity of perpetrators 
and the role of both Poles and Ukrainians in the conflict (Copsey, 2008; 
McBride, 2016; Pasieka, 2016). As one of the interviewees observed: 
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The closer we are to the historical truth, the closer we are to each other and 
the bigger respect we have to the common history, peace and security. 
(Activist, aged 48) 
According to the symbolic elites, the truth is not only important at the central 
level, but it also has a particular, personal dimension in the borderlands. It is 
fundamental for reconciliation in the local communities, small towns, and 
villages such as Pawłokoma and Piskorowice, where the inhabitants are still 
working through the past and unanswered questions about the fate of their 
relatives after the Volhynia massacre (Magierowski, 2016). In the borderlands 
the difficult history is still a sensitive issue and has to be handled competently: 
The moment we start talking about the history and [Polish-Ukrainian] 
violence, which are inherent to this land - hatred resurfaces. (Local activists, 
aged 47) 
At the same time, unsubstantiated claims about the historical events often 
fuel radical nationalistic attitudes and resentments towards the other. As pointed 
out in one of the interviews: 
(...) if we falsify history or forget about it, then we leave the dialogue to 
instigators. If we talk about the truth, then we will make them powerless. 
(Local authorities official, aged 58) 
Regardless of the nearly thirty years of reconciliatory efforts, the Poles and 
Ukrainians tend to view the past in black and white, struggling with acceptance 
of different shades of grey hidden in the opposing narratives and interpretations 
of their controversial history (Mazurkiewicz, 2015). The case of Polish historical 
re-enactment of Volhynia massacre in Radymno in 2013 shows how the one-
sided narrative feeds into nationalistic tendencies and resentments towards the 
Ukrainians in the local Poland. As Pasieka shows, such practices are often 
politically instrumentalised and lead to dangerous monopolisation of historical 
narrative, destructive to the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation process (Pasieka, 
2016). Another good example is a local conflict over the commemoration of 
Jozafat Kocyłowski, the Greek Catholic bishop of Przemyśl, beatified by the 
Pope John Paul II (Ziętal, 2013). The local Poles perceive him as a traitor, a 
Ukrainian priest who blessed the volunteers for SS Galizien and collaborated 
with the Nazis. For the Ukrainians, he is a national hero and a martyr 
persecuted for supporting Ukrainian independence. What both sides seem to 
neglect are the middle-ground interpretations which describe Kocyłowski as a 
priest engaged in the Polish-Ukrainian dialogue and defiant towards the Nazis 
(Gorczyca, 2013). 
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Such missed opportunities of reconciliatory encounters at the local level may 
even evolve to high-profile spoilers to Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation. The case 
of the Ukrainian monument in a cemetery in Hruszowice, near Przemyśl, aptly 
shows this form of negligence. The monument commemorating the Ukrainian 
Insurgent Army was illegally erected in 1994 and quickly became the source of 
Polish-Ukrainian controversies in the area (Ziętal, 2014). The local authorities 
pushed away the responsibility for dealing with the status of the monument by 
claiming it is not within their purview (Ziętal, 2014). Over the next years the 
monument was regularly and furtively devastated and rebuilt, feeding local 
resentments and uncovering the impotence of the local elites in mediating 
reconciliatory encounters (TVN24.pl, 2017). Eventually, the unresolved dispute 
has led to the involvement of the central government and destruction of the 
structure just before the 70th anniversary of the “Operation Vistula”. The 
Ukrainian Foreign Office described this action as a provocative attempt to divert 
the attention away from the Polish crimes against the Ukrainians (Wilczak, 
2017). 
These examples show that in many local conflicts, parties entrench 
themselves in their interpretations, losing an opportunity for establishing the 
common ground by acknowledging the controversies of the past. They attempt 
to literally and proverbially mark their “territory” with symbolic tokens such as 
cemeteries, monuments or commemorative plaques which represent exclusively 
their narrative and interpretation of history. This territorial struggle often 
assumes a violent form of dialogue in which both sides destroy and contest the 
symbols of the other, fuelling the “competition of victims” (Zhurzhenko, 2014) 
and inhibiting the chances for meaningful reconciliatory encounters. 
 
4.2 Relationship, Trust, and Asymmetry 
While encounters focus on resolving past issues through various forms of 
interactions and activities, the relationship is oriented towards the current state 
of affairs, the realisation of common goals and sustainability of good relations. 
According to Lederach, reconciliation should engage antagonised communities 
in a sustained and peaceful relationship, maximising human interactions within 
the conflict setting (Lederach, 1997, p. 25). Thus understood, relationship 
reflects how the two communities are positioned towards each other, what are 
their attitudes, how they perceive their mutual interests and realise them. 
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In this context, the Polish-Ukrainian relationship in the borderlands 
represents another problematic factor in the reconciliation process. Babiński 
notices that even though the Polish-Ukrainian interstate relations are amicable, 
the violent history and unresolved issues between Poles and Ukrainians weigh 
heavily on the region, distancing the groups from each other (Babiński, 1997, 
pp. 65–80). After the Polish accession to the EU and the Schengen zone, this 
distance in the relationship has increased. The Polish-Ukrainian border has 
become much more than a demarcation line, turning into the Eastern frontier of 
the unified Europe (Babiński, 1997). This state of affairs has increased tensions 
in the local communities, reinforcing caution, distrust, and asymmetry in 
relations between Poles and Ukrainians (Babiński, 1999). 
In terms of reconciliation, trust is the backbone of a healthy relationship. 
According to Lewicki trust is “a belief in the other, a tendency to attribute 
virtuous intentions to the other, and willingness to act on the basis of the other’s 
conduct” (Lewicki, 2006, p. 97). Without it, groups are unable to define mutual 
relations in terms of a partnership and often turn to competitive or even hostile 
behaviour (Colquitt & Rodell, 2007). At the same time, it is typical that 
communities which experienced outbreaks of violence in the past find it difficult 
to establish trust. It is no different in the case of local Poles and Ukrainians who 
still refer to each other as “backstabbers” (Smoleński, 2016). In the perspective 
of the symbolic elites, trust is a missing component in the Polish-Ukrainian 
relations in the borderlands, and consequently in the reconciliation process. 
This sense of distrust is grounded in the past and the feeling of victimhood. The 
stories of the massacres are still alive in the memories of our respondents and 
hamper their ability to open up and trust the Ukrainians. 
There are very brutal descriptions of the events. And it was neighbours 
against neighbours. So those descriptions tell us to be careful. Because so 
what that we lived next to each other? And he was a direct neighbour, just 
next to me, we knew each other for years? One night he just came and 
slaughtered the entire family. So, it is not the best climate to build 
friendships… Because how close can we get so that I will be sure that he 
won’t come tomorrow and stab me in the back? (Border official, aged 40) 
This sense of distrust is not necessarily grounded in reason and personal 
experiences. As one of the respondents explained: 
I would have some concerns [about partnering up with the Ukrainians], but I 
cannot say that I could substantiate this statement with any proof. I would 
say that it’s a stereotype which I inherited while living in the borderlands. I 
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would be worried about my investment (...), that my money might be stolen. 
(Teacher, aged 45) 
With such a low level of trust, reconciliatory relationships are difficult to 
sustain. This situation is further reinforced by a local perception of asymmetries 
in the Polish-Ukrainian relationship. 
Due to intensive Europeanization, Poland has become a part of a specific 
EU technocratic and border regime. Our respondents described this regime as a 
symbolic wall built between the Poles and Ukrainians, which introduced 
additional tensions into the relationship in the borderlands. 
In my experience, when we established the Schengen border and visas, the 
Ukrainians turned against the Poles. For them, it was the Poles who closed 
the border, who did not want them and created problems for them. But it 
wasn't our fault, it was our obligation. (...) [For the Ukrainians] it’s not the EU 
that is the bad guy, it’s us again. It spoiled our relationship. (Customs officer, 
aged 45) 
The introduction of Schengen has strengthened an imbalance in the 
relationship, where the Poles once again are perceived as those who dictate the 
terms to which the Ukrainians have to comply. Taking into account the historical 
inequalities between Poles and Ukrainians, this situation can be considered as 
an important spoiler in building a positive relationship in the borderlands. 
Asymmetry is also reflected in the perceived imbalance of reconciliatory 
efforts. This topic is especially sensitive in the borderlands, where reciprocity 
and symmetry in gestures are crucial for the sustainability of positive 
relationship (see also: Burlyuk, 2017). According to our respondents, the 
asymmetries revolve around property reclamation, treatment of minorities living 
in the borderlands and access to means of cultivation of national identity. As 
observed by one of the interviewees: 
There is no symmetry. There was a huge fight for the Polish Cultural Centre 
and Consulate General in Lviv. We had the same problem with establishing 
there the Roman Catholic curia. It was really tense, and after some time the 
Ukrainians offered us a piece of land saying “if you want something, build it 
from scratch”. (Activist, aged 45) 
At the same time, many interviewees noted that even though not without 
controversies, the Polish local authorities granted support to the Ukrainian 
minority in Przemyśl, including substantial property rights, e.g. to the Ukrainian 
Cultural Centre and the Greek Catholic Bishop's Palace. In such a fragile 
undertaking as the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation, both sides need to have 
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a sense that they equally contribute to the process. In the Polish local 
perspective, this is not the case. The sense of asymmetry is a vital and 
persisting problem, introducing new layers of conflict into the relationship. 
 
4.3 Innovation and European Integration 
Innovation includes new methods and pathways of reconciliation. It aims to 
open up the process to unorthodox ideas and introduce new perspectives into 
reconciliatory encounters and relationships (Lederach, 1997, p. 25). It allows to 
move the process forward and escape the vicious circle of ineffective and 
superficial gestures. Innovation addresses the main reconciliation spoilers, 
enabling the conflicted parties to refocus their efforts on new projects and ideas. 
According to our respondents, thus understood innovation is difficult to define in 
the current state of affairs and is yet to be introduced in the future. Even though 
they believe that the reconciliation should take place at the local level, during 
the interviews, they repeatedly turned to European integration as a possible 
innovation – a process that could change the dynamics of another process – the 
Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation. In this way, the elites distance themselves from 
problem-solving, waiting for a better opportunity such as integration of Ukraine 
into European structures. At the same time, the symbolic elites have a rather 
rational and utilitarian approach towards the role of the integration. They believe 
that the EU is too distanced and detached from the nuances of the conflict in 
order to become the driving force behind the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation. 
The EU could help, but it’s not that easy. (...) These problems can only be 
understood by the people living in the borderlands (...). It can try to assist in 
other ways, mediate, but it should be the Poles and Ukrainians who work 
these things out. (Activist, aged 25) 
Therefore, the interviewees suggested the possibility of mostly indirect and 
financial contribution of the EU to establishing reconciliatory encounters and 
relationships. This hopeful and optimistic outlook is not without reason as the 
Polish symbolic elites are used to thinking about the EU in utilitarian terms. For 
the locals, European integration is commonly understood as a funding scheme 
which has revived Polish economic and societal development. 
Our respondents believe that the narrowness of interactions in the 
borderlands could be mitigated by further association and integration of Ukraine 
with the EU. This applies specifically to encounters which would be achieved 
through expansion of the existing reconciliatory projects and development of 
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new activities within the framework of Europe without borders. Currently, many 
Polish cross-border activists involved in the dialogue on the historical 
grievances complain about the technical and financial constraints which are 
preventing them from building sustained partnerships with the Ukrainians. 
When the money stops, the common goals disappear. We do not have the 
funds to sustain the cooperation so everything falls apart. The [Polish-
Ukrainian] borderlands are very poor, so we could use some sustainable and 
continuous EU funding. (...) However, it must be designed in a way that both 
sides are treated equally and can benefit from the funds in an equal manner. 
(Activist, aged 60) 
In this sense, the funding provided by the EU could have a “connective 
impact”, leading to a broader societal effect and development of social networks 
across the border. 
Furthermore, in the eyes of the local elites, the EU could become a political 
platform facilitating a more structured and effective dialogue on truth and 
acknowledgment of controversial past. Here, the “enabling impact” of the 
European integration may encourage political actions and reconciliatory 
gestures that would be problematic under different circumstances. Both national 
and local political actors could use the EU normative and institutional framework 
in order to distance the reconciliatory politics from radicalised domestic parties 
and agree on matters that would otherwise create tensions at home 
(Shekhovtsov, 2011; Stępka, 2015). In this sense, 
[t]he EU has a big potential to influence reconciliation. (...) I imagine that in 
the future the Union will become a mediator between us. Surely, such a 
situation would help us integrate, understand each other and apologise. 
(Activist, aged 24) 
Thus, the interviewees have an optimistic outlook on the Ukrainian 
accession to the EU which, according to them would strengthen this type of 
reconciliatory encounters and create a possible pathway of escaping the vicious 
circle of ineffective and superficial gestures often manifested in high politics.4 
 
                                                          
4  As indicated by Diez and Hayward in their study of the reconciliation process between the Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, the impact of European integration can be rather ambiguous 
and lead to mixed results. The European integration always has its “winners” and “losers”, and 
while contributing to wealth and redefinition of interests and identities of some actors, it may also 
lead to strengthening of divisions between “the Europeanised” and the people who have been left 
on the margins of the European project (see: Diez and Hayward, 2008). 
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Our data reveals the importance of European integration seen as an 
opportunity to reshape the present Polish-Ukrainian relationship and to 
decrease the distance between the two communities. The interviewees believe 
that the region needs success stories, positive narratives on the Polish-
Ukrainian relations that would override the distrustful attitudes. In fact, this 
“constructive impact” of the EU could transform the underlying conflictual 
components of identities that are inhibiting the mutual trust. Positive 
experiences stemming from successful Polish-Ukrainian partnerships could 
gradually eradicate negative stereotypes and redefine the relationships in the 
borderlands. However, in order to do that, both sides need to (re)gain trust 
towards each other and learn to cooperate and work for the common benefit. 
Again, the financial assistance of the EU is seen as an important facilitating 
factor. 
These [European] funds will make us [NGOs] work together as partners. The 
people will surely become more responsible for each other, conscientious 
and organised. (Activist, aged 24) 
This way the “constructive impact” of the EU would help to turn the distrustful 
relationship into a more productive and balanced partnership. 
The Polish-Ukrainian relationship is also suffering from a perceived sense of 
asymmetry resulting from implementation of the Schengen regulations and 
different expectations towards the reconciliation process. The removal of the 
problematic border regime would help to address one of those problems by 
including Ukraine in a common European framework. According to the local 
elites, after the accession of Ukraine to the EU 
[t]here will be no physical border so there will be fewer reservations in our 
relationship. (Teacher, aged 45) 
In this sense, the respondents indicated that the wall dividing the 
borderlands into “those who compel” and “those who comply” would cease to 
exist, thus mitigating mutual objections and the asymmetry in the relationship. 
Our interviewees also believe that the integration may help to make 
reconciliatory efforts more compatible and balanced. 
(...) if we [the EU] urge such countries as Ukraine to introduce certain 
solutions, then as a consequence of integration it will be easier to 
communicate and cooperate with them. In a way, the EU can serve as a 
reconciliatory factor which will make us work and function together. (Teacher, 
aged 45) 
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Indeed, it is believed that the EU membership can have a “compulsory 
impact”, encouraging Polish and Ukrainian actors through “sticks and carrots” to 
adjust their behaviour into a more conciliatory. 
 
Conclusions: A Way of Moving Forward? 
The aim of this article was to explore and characterise the borderlands’ 
perspective on the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation, as framed by the local Polish 
symbolic elites in the period preceding the deterioration of state relations in 
2016. Even though this perspective is not included in the state level, it does 
exist in the discourses of the borderlands’ elites. It represents a more insightful 
outlook on the reconciliation, attuning it to the nuances of the Polish-Ukrainian 
relations and complexities of the region. As we have shown, the local 
perspective can be framed in three main themes, each tackling different aspects 
of the reconciliation process: encounters, relationship, and innovation. 
In this article, reconciliatory encounters were defined as a wide range of 
interactions which facilitate emotional healing between the conflicted parties and 
coming to terms with the difficult past. Our research has shown that this aspect 
of reconciliation is problematic from the local point of view. The Polish-Ukrainian 
borderlands are distinctly narrow in terms of interactions which are mostly 
pragmatic and focused on technicalities of every-day life. The Polish symbolic 
elites consider this problem as one of the major reconciliation spoilers. For 
them, the reconciliatory encounters between the Poles and Ukrainians should 
be deeper and address the problems underlying the tensions in the region. We 
have identified two focal aspects of these encounters: historical truth and 
acknowledgment of inconvenient facts. In the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands, 
truth is very personal, as the inhabitants of the region still live in the past and 
work through the memories of the violent history. The truth would bring the two 
communities closer together and guarantee that the reconciliation is based on 
facts, limiting the influence of radicals and instigators. It, however, has to be 
accompanied by an acknowledgment of the controversial past, no matter how 
inconvenient. As suggested in the article, acknowledgment could be an 
opportunity in disguise, making the parties reflect upon their fixed positions and 
accept different interpretations of history which could create a common ground 
for reconciliation. 
The local perspective on reconciliation is also reflected in the current state of 
affairs, here framed as a reconciliatory relationship. It is a continuous involvement 
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of antagonised parties, based on mutual trust, a realisation of common interests 
and sustainability of good relations. Our findings indicated that due to social and 
physical distance inherent to the borderlands such relationships between the 
Poles and Ukrainians are difficult to sustain on a larger scale. There is a strong 
sense of distrust grounded in the past, which makes it problematic to define and 
realise common goals, not to mention form lasting partnerships. Yet, the Polish-
Ukrainian relations in the borderlands are still described in terms of asymmetries 
and imbalances between the groups. One of such asymmetries is ascribed to the 
EU and Schengen regulations, which introduced additional constraints in the 
borderlands and distanced the Poles and Ukrainians even further. The second 
type relates directly to the reconciliation process and the perceived imbalance of 
reconciliatory gestures and efforts on the Ukrainian part. These spoilers reflect not 
only on the condition of the current state of affairs but also reveal the underlying 
tensions which weigh heavily on the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliatory relationship. 
Lastly, we focused our attention on innovation, understood as a search for 
unorthodox and new solutions to reconciliation spoilers. Our research has 
shown that the local elites do not see any immediate response to the defined 
problems, which in their opinion should be solved predominantly at the local 
level. Instead, they prefer to turn to more distant perspective – viewing the 
potential of Ukraine's integration with the EU as a sort of a “roadmap” to 
reconciliation. Even though the EU is perceived as detached from the regional 
problems, its financial assistance and power of influence are believed to play a 
role in the reconciliation. The local elites argue that the financial instruments of 
the EU could have a connective impact on Poles and Ukrainians, stimulating 
and reinvigorating reconciliatory encounters and relationship. With joint activities 
and positive stories of cooperation, both communities could start forming 
sustainable partnerships that could lead to a reconfiguration of antagonistic 
attitudes in the region. The elites also believe in the enabling power of the EU. 
By inclusion of Ukraine in the European structures, the relationship could be 
more balanced not only in the borderlands but also at the central level. In their 
perspective Poland and Ukraine could reach new levels of reconciliation through 
institutionalised dialogue far away from domestic, often radicalised and fixed 
political positions. Without a doubt, research on the Polish-Ukrainian 
reconciliation is still an open chapter in social sciences and requires further and 
more innovative approaches. It is crucial to look at this process beyond the 
state-level and consider that without the involvement of the borderlands and 
their perspective, Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation is still on a rocky road. 
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